Harvest Now, Decrypt Later (HNDL) is a real threat that cybersecurity leaders need to mitigate at their organizations today
MondayMove gives you one concrete action every Monday. FridayFollowUp closes the loop.
Each Friday, a short dispatch on what practitioners actually found when they ran the week's move: where they got stuck, what surprised them, and what to do next. Not sanitized case studies. Field notes. Practitioner to practitioner.
This week's move was tactical but uncomfortable: without fancy tools or budget, document your public endpoints, TLS versions, cipher suites, cert aging policies, and when your application will support TLS 1.3 + ML-KEM. Start building your CBOM before quantum computing makes it a crisis instead of a project.
You've had the week. Let's talk about what happened.
We didn't set out to form a roadmap for post-quantum readiness. No vendor pitch. Just an honest check-in on what you actually found when you looked at your cryptographic posture with fresh eyes.
Did you open the text file?
You had to start somewhere.
Did you start the inventory, or did the week swallow it? Was finding your public endpoints easier than expected, or did you realize you don't have a single source of truth? Did you do this solo, or did you need to pull in someone from infrastructure or DevOps?
What the inventory actually showed you
How many endpoints did you document? Were there any surprises — shadow IT, forgotten test environments left open to the public, third-party integrations you'd lost track of? What TLS versions are you running? Any TLS 1.0 or 1.1 still in production?
How deep did you get into the cipher suites? Did you already know what cipher suites your applications support, or was this new territory? How many of your endpoints are quantum-vulnerable right now? Did you find any weak or deprecated ciphers still enabled?
The cert question nobody wants to answer
What does your current certificate posture look like? Are you at 90 days, a year, longer? How close are you to the upcoming 47-day browser requirement? Is your renewal process automated or still manual?
The vendor conversation
Did you find documentation on when your application stack will support post-quantum cryptography? Did you discover that your vendors don't have a timeline yet? Is this something your team controls, or are you dependent on third-party updates?
The gap between assumed and actual
Did you find endpoints you didn't know existed? Did you realize your inventory process is more manual than you thought? Did this exercise surface a gap between what you thought your cryptographic posture was and what it actually is? Did you communicate with your vendors and find that they have decided to categorize updating their application to support PQC as 'custom development?'
Organizational readiness
Did you surface this with leadership or your team? What was the reaction — urgency, indifference, or surprise? Does your organization understand the quantum threat timeline, or is this still abstract to them? Do you have budget or roadmap space to address this before 2030?
What changes?
Finally, what happens now? Is this a one-time snapshot, or the start of a living inventory? Were you already planning for migrating to TLS 1.3 and post-quantum cipher suites? What's the first actual change you'll make based on what you documented?
Drop your answers in the comments — no names needed, no specifics required. What I care about is what the inventory surfaced that your security dashboard never would have.
And if you didn't start the inventory this week, that's worth saying too. What got in the way? Lack of access, uncertainty about where to start, or the realization that you'd need help from teams you don't have a relationship with yet? Where it stalls says something real about how cryptographic visibility gets prioritized in security work.
No correct answers here. This is practitioner-to-practitioner. The more honest the responses, the more useful this gets for everyone reading on Monday morning.
See you then.
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